Overview
I work on a variety of issues in moral and political philosophy. My dissertation discusses rights, blame, and respect. I have published on promising and am interested in normative powers more broadly. I have work in progress on blameworthiness, dignity, and relational morality. I am also interested in contractualism, moral emotions, and the idea of moral equality.
Publications
“Conventionalism and Contingency in Promissory Powers,” Philosophical Studies (2023) (PhilPapers) (pre-pub draft) (free, view-only PDF)
I argue that conventionalists about promising can and should accommodate a claim that is usually thought to make trouble for their view: the power of promise is morally necessary.
“Promises, Intentions, and Reasons for Action,” Ethics (2021) (PhilPapers) (pre-pub draft)
I consider the view that to accept a promise is to intend the performance of the promised action and argue that this view makes it difficult to explain an essential property of promises: they provide reasons for performance.
Dissertation
Significant Others. Committee: Michael McKenna (chair), Tom Christiano, Mark Timmons, Steve Wall.
Philosophers and lay people alike tend to overlook things by dwelling on the downsides of having moral obligations, and ignoring the fact that these obligations reflect the importance of their possessor.
Chapter 1. In the theory of rights, we have overlooked the significance of our enabling rights, which function to protect our ability to do our duty.
Chapter 2. In the ethics of blame, we have overlooked the fact that blaming someone is an important vehicle for recognizing their importance as a person whose regard for others matters in its own right.
Chapter 3. And in our theory of respect, we have overlooked the specific form of respect associated with taking others’ obligations seriously.
Attending to these oversights offers us a more complete picture of the contours of our own importance, provides us a better sense of what we owe others who possess obligations, and promises to help reconcile us to the obligations that structure our lives.
Work in progress and under review
Dissertation chapter about rights (R&R at Australasian Journal of Philosophy)
Dissertation chapter about blame (R&R at Ethics)
“Quality of Will: Expression or Possession?” (conference-length draft)
I argue that actions can express objectionable attitudes and evaluations that an agent does not actually possess, and that this explains why remorse and resentment can be fitting in unusual cases—such as those involving apparent moral dilemmas—even in the absence of ill will.
“Relational Roots” (extended abstract)
I argue that attempts to locate the primitive relational notion at the heart of morality have fallen short, and suggest an alternative.
“Dignity’s Demands”
I argue that contemporary accounts of dignity—which associate it with entitlements—miss something important that traditional conceptions captured well: that dignity can manifest in the possession of obligations.